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Fox and reported in volume 258 of the Pacific Reporter begin-
ning at page 1079 I would reverse the judgment and thus up-
hold the action of the board in denying the license. 
Edmonds, J., and Schauer, ,J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 28, 
1954. Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Schauer, J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
[Crim. No. 5532. In Bank. Apr. 2, 1954.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JAMES FRANKLIN 
WOLFE et al., Appellants. 
[1] Criminal Law- Appeal- Harmless Error- Misconduct of 
Prosecuting Attorney.-It was not prejudicial misconduct for 
prosecuting attorney in a murder case to ask defendant if he 
left his knife in victim's back, where there was no objection by 
defense counsel nor any motion to strike, and where jury was 
instructed that it was sole judge of value and effect of evi-
dence, that it could not convict defendant on mere suspicion, 
that prosecution was bound to establish defendant's guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt, and that, unless it did so, it was jury's 
duty to find defendant not guilty. 
[2] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting At-
torney.-While it was highly improper for prosecuting attorney 
in a murder case to comment, in his closing argument to jury, 
on failure to produce certain witnesses and to state that the 
witnesses, if produced, would have been too honest to perjure 
themselves for defendants and afraid to testify for the People, 
such misconduct was not so prejudicial to defendants as to 
result in a miscarriage of justice where evidence of their guilt 
was overwhelming. ( Const., art. VI, § 4:lj2 .) 
[3] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error- Instructions- Confessions.-
Refusal to instruct jury in a murder case that a confession 
must be free and voluntary did not result in prejudice to de-
fendants where, on being questioned immediately after crime, 
they insisted that the killing was done because deceased was 
out to "get" them, where court reporter, who was present at 
time, testified that defendants' statements were not made 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, §§ 1404(8), 1407(5); 
[2] Criminal Law, § 1404(18); [3] Criminal Law, § 1434; [4] 
Homicide, §§ 189, 190; [5] Criminal Law, § 734; [6] Homicide, 
§ 222. 
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under any promise and that no threat or force was used on 
either of them, wherr; questions and answers were then read 
to jury without objection by defense counsel, where defendants 
testifit>d at trial in same \'ein as answers they had given just 
after commission of crime, where no instruction as to admis-
sions and confessions was requested by defense, and where 
evidence was sufficient, independently of confessions or admis-
sion, to sustain verdict. 
[4a, 4b] Homicide- Instructions- Manslaughter: Second Degree 
Murder.-Failure to give an instruction in a homicide case as 
to manslaughter or provocation sufficient to reduce crime from 
murder to manslaughter or from first degree murder to second 
degree murder was not error where it appeared, from defend-
ants' own story that they had discussed killing deceased the 
night before crime was committed and again on day of crime 
just before breakfast, that crime was either first degree murder 
or a homicide committed in self-defense, where there was no 
evidence of a sudden quarrel or any such passion as would 
make doubtful the formation of a deliberate and premeditated 
intent to kill, and where jury was adequately instructed on law 
of self-defense and fear necessary to justify a homicide, as 
well as on law applicable to both first and second degree 
murder. 
[5] Criminal Law-Instructions- Requisites.-Instructions must 
be responsive to issues which are determined by the evidence. 
[6] Homicide-Instructions-Self-defense.-Evidence in a homi-
cide case as to a quarrel on day before the killing, together 
with evidence showing that deceased had procured a knife 
and had threatened to kill defendants, justifies an instruction 
on self-defense. 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b) ) , from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacra-
mento County and from orders denying a new trial. Ray-
mond T. Coughlin, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of murder in first 
degree imposing death penalty, affirmed. 
Anthony J. Scalora, under appointment by the Supreme 
Court, for Appellants. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, 
Deputy Attorney General, J. Francis 0 'Shea, District At-
torney (Sacramento), and Edward L. McCarthy, Deputy 
District. Attorney, for Respondent. 
[ 4] See Cal.Jur., Homicide, § 62; Am.Jur., Homicide, § 554 et seq. 
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CARTER, J.-Defendants James 1'-,ranklin Wolfe and Jo-
seph ,Johansen, while confined in Folsom State Prison serving 
life sentences, were charged by indictment with the murder, 
on May 8, 1953, of one Harold Stricker, also an inmate of 
Folsom, and in Count II with a violation of section 4500 of 
the Penal Code. 'l'hey entered pleas of not guilty, and not 
guilty by reason of insanity, to Count I, and trial by jury 
was ordered. Subsequently, the plea of not guilty by reason 
of insanity was withdrawn, and Count II was, upon motion, 
set aside. After trial by jury a verdict of murder of the first 
degree was returned as to both defendants and the penalty 
was fixed at death. Defendants' motions for a new trial were 
denied. The appeal is automatic (Pen. Code, § 1239 (b)). 
On May 7, 1953, Stricker and Johansen had an argument 
over a game of dominoes. Stricker, at that time, was appar-
ently very angry and threatened to s1ap and strike Johansen, 
and to ''get'' both Johansen and his cellmate, \Volfe, if they 
came out in the yard the next morning. Stricker called both 
defendants vile names and told Johansen he would ''slap the 
... out of him.'' That night in their cell both defendants 
talked the matter over; another inmate informed them that 
Stricker had a knife and '.vas going to ''get'' both of them 
the next morning. Defendants discussed getting knives with 
which to kill Stricker; the possibility of being caught at it and 
receiving the death penalty was discussed between them. They 
testified that they had decided that, despite the penalty, they 
thought it was better to get Stricker before he got them. The 
next morning they procured knives from an unidentified source 
and, after again talking it over, walked around the prison yard 
watching Stricker who was playing dominoes. The only con-
versation defendants had with Stricker that morning was 
when Wolfe asked him if he were going to play dominoes and 
Stricker's reply that he was. They testified that they saw 
Stricker go in one of the prison buildings and come out with 
a jacket on ; that they thought he had gotten a knife ; that they 
walked around and finally decided they would get Stricker 
before he got tl1em. The defendants approached Stricker, who 
was sitting down with his bark toward them, and between the 
two of them stabbed Jlim some seven times. Medical trstimony 
siJow<'d that ally one. of ihe:'e knife. wo11nds could have eaused 
deatli. ,1ohansell 's knife was foUlH1 in the back of the deeeased. 
Several g-uanls were present at the time of the crime and testi-
fied to the manner in which defendants stabbed Stricker, and 
that no knife was found in Stricker's possession. Defendants 
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testified that knew the were there and watching 
them; that decided it was better to Stricker at that 
time because if with the knives it would 
' and that Stricker 
would then build up his for violence by saying they 
were "weak" and "scared" and that when they got out of 
segregation, he would still them. Several inmates testified 
to the domino on the 7th and that Stricker's repu-
tation for violence was bad and that he was very belligerent. 
Defendants argue that the attorney was guilty 
of misconduct in two instances. Their first 
contention that it was error for the prosecu-
tion to ask defendant Johansen if he left his knife in the 
victim's is without merit. The deputy district attorney 
asked " [W] hat to your knife?" to which 
''It was left in the victim's back.'' The 
next question was, ''Did you leave it in the victim's back Y'' 
to which defendant Johansen "Yes." There was no 
objection defense nor was there any motion to 
strike. It is next that the use of the quoted expres-
sion assumes the of the defendant. People v. Williams 
( 1860), 17 Cal. relied upon defendants is not in point. 
There, the trial in instructing the jury, said, ''The 
fact that the deceased was a Chinaman gave the defendant 
no more to take his life than if he had been a white 
person; nor did the fact, if you so find, that the defendant 
was to enforce the collection of taxes against another 
Chinaman, or even give the defendant 
any right to take his life .... " (Emphasis added.) This 
court, in reversing, held that the instruction assumed that 
the deceased was killed when that very issue was 
involved and that ''even an equivocal expression coming from 
the judge, may be fatal to the prisoner." (Emphasis added.) 
In the present case, the expression did not come from the 
judge, but from the attorney without objection 
by defense counsel or motion to strike being made, and the 
jury was instructed that it was the sole judge of the value 
and effect of the evidence ; that it could not convict a de-
fendant upon mere ; that the prosecution was 
"bound to establish the of a defendant beyond a reason-
able doubt, and unless the prosecution does so, then it is 
your duty to find the defendant not guilty." 
[2] The second instance in which the prosecution is said 
to be guilty of prejudicial misconduct was in the closing 
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the name of Jack Garner was were 
all together when this 
not Mr. [ G] arner brought down 
to what occurred, to testify as to 
seated right at the table there. Is it ladies and gentle-
men, that Mr. Garner was honest that he wouldn't come 
down and himself? Is it that that is the 
reason that he was not the defense f Why 
didn't the People them down'? ladies and gentle-
men, hgw many convicts do you think testify on behalf 
of the People in a case like this? How many convicts do you 
think are to risk their lives in order to see justice 
done? You know that they are few and far between, and 
you know that if any man, any convict came down here and 
testified against Mr. Wolfe and Johansen he would be setting 
himself up for a knife in his own back. You know that be-
cause you know as common, that a stoolie, 
a man who informs or testifies his fellow convict is 
the most hated, the most man among convicts. 
"Ladies and Gentlemen, I wonder if Farrington 
was actually one of the four who were seated at that table 
playing dominoes that afternoon. I wonder about that. 
Mr. Johansen said that the people who were playing when 
that argument took where Mr. Garner, Mr. Stricker 
himself, and a man called Whitey Knoles [sic]. Whitey 
Knoles~ now, Knoles is not like 'Farrington.' It 
is altogether different. He couldn't make a mistake like that. 
If Farrington were actually the one who were playing, he 
couldn't have done it, ladies and So I seriously 
put it to you, was Farrington actually seated at that 
table. Does he know anything about it at all1 And if he 
was playing, what about the rest of the convicts who came 
down and testified? Ladies and Gentlemen, there is testi-
mony here that a man by the name of Clark was assaulted 
by Mr. Stricker the same day. was not Mr. Clark 
brought down to testify as to-- [Objection by defense 
()()8 PEOPL:DJ v. \V OLl~'E [42 C.2d 
counsel that such a procedure would have been improper to 
which the Court replied that the wonld decide strictly 
in accordanee with the (widenee j. '' 'rhe reputation of Mr. 
Stricker must have been known to Mr. Clark as a fellow 
inmate. 'rhe reputation of Mr. Stricker, ladies and gentle-
men, must have been known also to Tex Goodman. Why 
wasn't he brought down 'I . . . [Cited by defense counsel 
as prejudicial misconduct to which the Court replied that 
it was instructing the jury to decide the case strictly in ac-
cordance with the evidence.] Ladies and Gentlemen, where 
are the men that Stricker was allegedly talking to on May 
8th, the three men that Mr. Johansen says he knows but he 
doesn't know their names? vVhy weren't they brought down? 
Why didn't the people bring any of these men down? Well, 
I think I have explained that to you pretty clearly 
already .... " 
Defendants contend that this argument told the jury that 
had certain witnesses appeared they would have testified 
for the People but if they had so done, they wouTd have 
risked being killed by their fellow convicts. It has been held 
prejudicial misconduct and prejudicially erroneous for the 
prosecution to comment on the failure of a witness to appear 
and that had he done so, he would have testified in a certain 
manner or to facts not in evidence (People v. Kirkes, 39 
Cal.2d 719 [249 P.2d 1] ; People v. Evans, 39 Cal.2d 242 
[246 P.2d 636]; People v. Cook, 148 Cal. 334 [83 P. 43]; 
People v. Glass, 158 Cal. 650 [112 P. 281] ; People v. Srnith, 
121 Cal. 355 [53 P. 802] ) . Part of the argument here was 
directed toward the failure of the defense to ·produce a 
witness who was allegedly playing dominoes with Stricker 
and defendant Johansen on the day before the crime. It 
was said he was too honest to perjure himself by testifying 
for the defense that StrickeJ;" had made a threat against the 
lives of the two defendants and that he was afraid to testify 
for the prosecution because of what might thereafter happen 
to him at the hands of his fellow prisoners. Another part 
of the argument was to the effect that two prisoners whom 
the defense claimed Stricker had assaulted (in an endeavor 
to show the reputation of the deceased for violence was bad) 
were not produced as witnesses; still another part of the 
argument questioned whether one Farrington, who was a 
witness, had really been present at the time as he said he 
was or whether, as testified to by~Johansen, it had been one 
Whitey Forbes (referred to in the argument as Whitey 
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Knoles). There was testimony by an inmate that "Whitey" 
and "Marty" Farrington were the same person. Whether 
or not Marty Farrington and vVhitey were the same person 
was a question of fact for the jury since the testimony on 
the subject did nothing more than create a conflict in the 
evidence. It was, however, highly improper for the prosecu-
tion to comment on the failure to produce certain witnesses 
and to state that the witnesses, if produced, would have 
been too honest to perjure themselves for the defendants 
and afraid to testify for the People. Such conduct should 
not be condoned, and is not here approved. Had the People 
desired to have the men alluded to produced as witnesses, 
the procednre common in such cases was open. It is only 
because of the overwhelming evidence of guilt in this case 
that we do not declare such misconduct sufficiently prejudicial 
to warrant a reversal. But we cannot say, after an exami-
nation of the entire cause, that the remarks of the prosecuting 
attorney were so prejudicial to defendants as to result in a 
miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4:Y2 ; People v. 
Dail, 22 Cal.2d 642, 659 [140 P.2d 828); People v. Estorga, 
206 Cal. 81 [273 P. 575] ; People v. Adams, 92 Oal.App. 6 
[267 P. 906] .) 
It is next contended that the trial court erred in failing 
to give certain requested instructions. [3] The :first assign-
ment of error is that the court refused to instruct the jury 
that a confession must be free and voluntary. Immediately 
after the killing, defendants were taken to a room controlled 
by prison officials before a member of the district attorney's 
staff, a detective and a court reporter. Both defendants 
answered questions concerning· the events of May 7th and 
8th ; both defendants insisted that the killing was done be-
cause Stricker was out to ''get'' them. Merrick, the court 
reporter present, testified upon questioning by the prosecution 
that the defendants' statements were not made under any 
promise and that no threat or force was used on either of 
them. The questions and answers were then read to the 
jury without objeetion by defense counsel. Both defendants 
testified at the trial and their testimony covered the same 
subject matter as that which is now objected to as a con-
fession involuntarily given. ·while it would have been better 
practice to have instructed the jury as to admissions and 
confessions, no such instruction was requested by the defense, 
although it waR requested by the People. In view of the 
fact that defendants testified at the trial in the same vein as 
670 PEOPLE v. WoLFE [42 C.2d 
the answers after the commission of the 
crime and defense counsel testified that he had no objection 
to the of the of defendants' statements, 
could have resulted from the failure to so in-
v. 30 Oal.2d 530 [183 
witness was examined for the purpose 
the defendants' confession had been volun-
that there had 
no coercion no violence. The trial 
court there refused to instruct the that it was its province 
to determine whether the confession had been freely and 
voluntarily We held that the stipulation ''in the 
absence of circumstances, removes from contro-
versy the question of coercion." It was pointed out that there, 
as here, the was instructed that it was the judge 
of the of the witnesses and of the of the 
evidence. In the case at the jury was also instructed 
that oral admissions or statements made by a defendant at a 
time when he was not under oath and not testifying as a 
witness in the case were to be viewed with caution because 
he might not have understood the questions and for ''other 
reasons." In the Barnes case we held that "It would have 
been better practice to instruct them [members of the jury] 
that they were the exclusive judges as to whether or not 
the confession was true distinguished from its voluntary 
character]. . . . The failure of the court to give such an 
instruction, did not defendant." vVe 
there concluded that the evidence was sufficient to sustain 
the verdict independently of the confession. (See, also, People 
v. Httrst, 36 Oal.App.2d 63 [96 P.2d 1003] .) There is merit 
in the People's in the case at bar, the defend-
ant's pretrial statements constituted admissions rather than 
confessions in that at all times, insisted that the 
killing had been clone in self-defense. In People v. Fowler, 
178 Cal. 657, 666 [174 P. , the court after commenting 
upon the evidence, said: ''Thus the statement itself would 
show that the was done by defendant in his lawful 
self-defense. Such an admission, as we have shown, is not 
a confession of the or an acknowledgment of guilt 
thereof. It is a declaration of innocence; that no crime was 
committed; that the of Duree was a justifiable homicide 
and not murder or " also, People v. 
Arnold, 108 Oal.App.2d 723 [239 P.2d 449] ; People v. 
Cryder, 90 Cal.App.2d 194, 203 [202 P.2d 765] .) Aside 
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30 Cal. 
of the 
an instruction on 
was instructed on first and second 
defense; on ,n,,nr•<~ 
both express and 
no evidence in the record to 
slaughter. Defendants' 
sudden or heat of pm;sicm 
so as to an instruction on 
that there was sufficient evidence 
to show that an instruction on 
would have been 
UHQC•v.u; on '1W;Hvv, 
appear that there was 
an instruction on man-
showed that there was no 
at the time of the crime 
'"".,."""" manslaughter; 
the crime itself 
In People v. 748 [297 P. 23], the court, 
in commenting on 's refused instruction on 
manslaughter, "In the instant case, the de-
fendant offered neither nor evidence as to any fact which 
would have justified the jury in the defendant guilty 
only of manslaughter. The only justification which the de-
fendant offered for his otherwise deliberate and premeditated 
murder was the plea of self-defense. If the jury found that 
his testimony with regard to that was wholly unsup-
ported and unbelievable it had no other alternative than that 
of finding him guilty of a unprovoked and cold-blooded 
murder. Under such circumstances the authorities fully sus-
tain the trial court in refusing to give to the jury an instruc-
tion concerning or manslaughter. [Citations. J " 
(People v. Sutw, 41 Cal.2d 483, 494 [261 P.2d 241] ; 
People v. Atwlde, 24 Oal.2d 188 [148 P.2d 627].) 
Defendants argue that the jury should have been in-
structed that adequate provocation may reduce an inten-
tional killing from murder to and that it may 
also raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the members 
of the jury that the defendants formed the intent to kill and 
carried it out after deliberation and premeditation. Defend-
ants rely upon People v. Valentine, 28 Cal.2d 121 [169 P.2d 
1], for the proposition that " ... the existence of provoca-
tion which is not 'adequate' to reduce the class of the offense 
may nevertheless raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
formed the intent to kill upon, and carried it out after, de-
liberation and premeditation." (People v. Valentine, supra, 
28 Cal.2d 121, 132.) It is argued, with merit, that the jury 
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was not instructed as to what constitutes sufficient provocation 
to reduce the crime from mnrder of first degree to that of 
the seeond degree. The jury was instructed fully, in accord-
ance with the recent decisions of this court, as to both first 
and seeond degree murder. In the instruction on the differ-
ence between first and second degree murder, the jury was 
told that "It [murder of the first degree] must be formed 
upon a pre-existing reflection and not ttpon a sudden heat 
of passion or provocation or other circumstance sufficient to 
preclude deliberation and premeditation .... '' (Emphasis 
added.) 
In the Valentine case ( stlpra, 28 Cal.2d 121) there was a 
quarrel immediately preceding the killing. In that case, 
Grroneous instructions were given in several instances as the 
court pointed out at page 130: "In three essential and fatal 
respects the instructions given in this case resemble the 
instructions condemned in People v. Thomas ( 1945), 25 Cal. 
2d 880 [156 P.2d 7] : (1) 'l'he jury were told that the exist-
ence of a specific intent to kill (which, of course, exists in 
voluntary manslaughter and in second degree murder as well 
as in some types of first degree murder) constitutes a homicide 
murder of the first degree; (2) the effect of provocation and 
passion as ·reducing the class of a homicide from murder 
to manslaughter was emphasized and the effect of provocation 
and passion as possibly precluding or making doubtful the 
formation of a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill 
was ignored; and ( 3) the jury were told, in effect, that the 
burden of proving circumstances which would mitigate the 
offense from murder of the first to murder of the second 
degree was upon the defendant." In the case at bar, no 
complaint is made that the instructions given were erroneous, 
but only that instructions on manslaughter and provocation 
should have been given. From the facts as testified to by 
defendants themselves, it would appear that they had dis-
cussed killing Stricker the night before the crime was com-
mitted and again on the day of the crime just before breakfast. 
It would appear, from defendants' own story, that the crime 
was either murder of the first degree, or a homicide committed 
in self-defense and justifiable as such. There was here no 
evidence of a sudden quarrel or any such passion as would 
make ''doubtful the formation of a deliberate and premedi-
tated intent to kill." (People v. Valentine, sttpra, 28 Cal.2d 
121, 132.) The jury was fully and fairly instructed on the 
law of self-defense and the fear necessary to justify a homicide. 
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If the after advised on the 1aw of self-
did not believe that ''the circumstances such 
as to excite the fears of a reasonable man in a similar 
position ... '' it could do no less than follow the law as set 
forth in the instruetions relating to murder of the first degree, 
since defendants' own testimony the theory that 
they were provoked, or so under the influence of passion as 
to make it doubtful that they could have formed a deliberate 
and premeditated intent to kilL [5] It is settled law that 
instructions must be responsive to the issues which are deter-
mined by the evidence. The record here does not bring the 
case within the factual situation presented by People v. Valen-
tine, sttpra, where the killing was committed during a sudden 
quarrel and where the deceased had been guilty of making 
accusations against the defendant within a few moments of 
the commission of the crime. In addition, other erroneous 
instructions in the Valentine case added to the error here-
tofore discussed. 'We said in People v. Thomas, 25 Cal. 
2d 880, 903 [156 P.2d 7], "Provocation of a kind, to a degree, 
and under circumstances insufficient to fully negative or raise 
a reasonable doubt as to the idea of both premeditation and 
malice (thereby reducing the offense to manslaughter) might 
nevertheless be adequate to negative or raise a reasonable 
doubt as to the idea of premeditation or deliberation, leaving 
the homicide as murder of the second degree; i.e., an unlawful 
killing perpetrated with malice aforethought but witho1d 
premeditat·ion and delibemtion. 
"Murder of the second degree may be defined as the un-
lawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought 
but which killing is not perpetrated by means of poison, or 
lying in wait, or torture, is not wilful, deliberate and pre-
meditated, and is not committed in the perpetration of or 
attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or 
mayhem. (See Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189.) It is apparent from 
the facts previously recited that the homicide in this case, 
if it was murder at all, was murder of the second degree 
unless the killing ·was 'wilful, deliberate and premeditated.' 
The existence of provocation and its extent and effect, if 
any, upon the mind of defenclant in rdation to premedita-
tion and deliberation in fonm'ng the specific intent to kill, 
as well as in regard to the existence of malice (Pen. Code, 
§ 188), constit1de questions of fact for the jury and they 
should have been so advised." (Emphasis partially added.) 
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In the Thomas case, as well as in the Valentine case, the 
murder occurred during a sudden quarrel. In the Thomas 
case, the question was presented whether the defendant had 
previously formed an intent to kill. In both cases, man-
slaughter instructions were given; in both cases, murder of 
the first degree was enoneously defined for the jury ; in both 
cases there were doubtful instructions concerning the burden 
of proof; in both cases, the evidence was in substantial con-
flict. In the case at bar, there is no conflict in the evidence; 
no instruction was given on manslaughter; no sudden quarrel 
was involved; the instruction on murder of the first (as well 
as of the second degree) was correct, and is not questioned. 
The question for determination, as it appears to us, is whether 
the record shows any evidence which would warrant an in-
struction informing the jury that provocation insufficient to 
reduce the crime from murder of the first degree to man-
slaughter might yet be sufficient to reduce the crime from 
first degree murder to that of the second degree. [6] We 
are of the opinion that the evidence of a quarrel the day 
before the killing, together with the evidence showing that 
the deceased had procured a knife and had threatened to 
kill the defendants justified the instruction on self-defense 
which was defendants' theory and which was fully given to 
the jury. [4b] We are unable to see how the evidence of 
the quarrel and the threat on the day before the killing 
together with the facts surrounding the crime (the lack of 
conversation between the deceased and the defendants; the 
fact that decedent was seated, with his back to the defendants, 
playing dominoes with other prisoners) could be considered 
as sufficient to support a verdict of second degree murder. 
In other words, we feel that the facts of this case would not 
support a conclusion, or justify an instruction, to the effect 
that there was sufficient provocation to reduce the degree of 
the crime to second degree murder. The facts show that the 
killing was either done in self-defense, or that it was a de-
liberate and premeditated murder. 
In view of the evidence presented, the . errors complained 
of are not of sufficient gravity to have resulted in a miscar-
riage of justice (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4%) and thus warrant 
a reversal of the judgments. 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments and orders deny-
ing defendants' motions for a new trial are therefore affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
